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The Semantics of Non-Declaratives: 
Investigating German Exlamatories* 
Dietmar Zaefferer, München 
0. Introduction 
Four years ago I heard John Searle speak at the Speech Acts Working Group 
of the Vienna International Congress of Linguistics and was quite impressed 
by his sportsmanlike give and take in argument, which contrasted pleasantly 
with the stiff academic style still customary in some German universities. This 
experience gave me the idea of regarding the comparison of different ap-
proaches to the semantics of non-declaratives as a kind of sports competition, 
the theories being the competitors and their authors being the coaches. The 
problem is that most coaches never let their trainees really run, but just 
describe what it would look like if they ran. So the task of comparing turned 
out to be guesswork with respect to many criteria and the focus of my in-
vestigation shifted gradually from a comparison of approaches to the prob-
lems they try to solve, or, more precisely, to one special problem from among 
them, namely the semantics of German exclamatories. I can only hope that 
the reader will not be too disappointed if therefore I will give only a sketchy 
survey of only some approaches, and that he will share instead my interest in 
the relatively little known problems to which the semantics of exclamatory 
sentences give rise,1 even if the results may seem somewhat provisional. 
1. The Rules of the Competition 
The rules are nowhere explicitly stated, but I hope to do justice to most of the 
people involved in proposing the following framework of reference: 
* I should like to thank Godehard Link and Thomas Becker for stimulating discussions at various 
stages of this paper as well as Barbara H. Partee and Nuel D. Belnap for their encouraging and 
helpful comments on its first version; thanks are due also to Mary Howard, Craig Thiersch and 
Jane Garrett for checking my English and to Gabriele Hollmann for typing the manuscript. 
I dedicate this paper to my son Sirtan whose birth caused a rejoicing interruption in my work 
on this paper as well as many joyful exclamations. 
1 Correspondingly, the size of the relevant literature is rather small. Examples are von Roncador 
1976 for German, Culioli 1974 and Gérard 1980 for French, and Elliott 1974 and N. McCawley 
1973 for English. 
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1.1 Terminological Preliminaries 
a) 'Semantics' should be understood in a broad sense as the theory of meaning 
in a pretheoretical sense, where 'meaning' includes almost anything which 
can systematically be assigned to the form or gestalt of linguistic signs: 
content, function, lexical, grammatical, and structural meaning; 
b) the distinction between declarative and non-declarative sentences should 
be regarded as a matter of syntactic sentence mood and it should not be 
confused either with the indicative/non-indicative distinction, the latter 
being a matter of verbal mood - which only co-determines sentence mood - , 
or the statement/non-statement distinction and the distinction between 
constative and non-constative utterances, these latter being a matter of 
illocution type. 
1.2 Handicaps: Theoretical Presumptions 
Since I am a coach of competitors myself I cannot avoid some personal bias. 
This enters the game with my theoretical presumptions, which - although they 
are rather weak - naturally are handicaps for all those who reject them: 
(TP 1) It is necessary to distinguish between a locutionary and an illocu-
tionary level of linguistic analysis, the former being concerned with 
propositional content and the like, the latter with communicative 
function, conventional force and the like. 
(TP 2) On the locutionary level, the notion of truth should be taken as central 
for the meaning of at least a large subset of the declarative sentences 
of the language under consideration, i.e. a truth conditional semantics 
is presupposed for the locutionary aspect of the meaning of declarative 
sentences, whether it be of the possible worlds (Montague, Lewis) or 
the situation semantics (Barwise) variety. 
1.3 Score Scheme: Criteria of Adequacy 
Let me now (without discussion of the proposals made in the literature) present 
the catalogue of criteria I should like to make use of. 
Let L be a natural language. 
Every adequate linguistic theory of the meaning of non-declarative sen-
tences of L (L-NDS) should meet the following criteria: 
(CA 1) It should be based on a complete and correct syntax of the L - N D S , 
which 
(CA 1.1) includes a list of the types (categories) of L - N D S ; 
(CA 1.2) accounts for the structural connections among L - N D S and also 
between L - N D S and syntactically related L - D S (declarative sen-
tences of L) ; 
(CA 1.3) accounts for the structural connections between L - N D S and their 
embedded counterparts, if any; 
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(CA 1.4) accounts for the syntactic relations between embedded counter-
parts of L - N D S , if any, and the embedding structures. 
Such a theory should furthermore 
(CA 2) explicate the notions of meaning and logical content of L - N D S in 
such a way that it 
(CA 2.1) gives an intuitively adequate evaluation (analogous to truth con-
ditions) for every illocutionary reading of an L - N D S ; 
(CA 2.2) accounts for the intuitive ambiguities of L - N D S , both on the 
locutionary and on the illocutionary level, if any, and predicts 
correctly their interaction; 
(CA 2.3) accounts for the logical properties of L - N D S and the logical 
relations among them and also between L - N D S and L - D S , on the 
illocutionary as well as on the locutionary level; 
(CA 2.4) explicates the relations between the meanings of L - N D S and those 
of their embedded counterparts, if any; 
(CA 2.5) makes it possible to explicate the meaning of predicates which 
embed these counterparts, if any. 
2. The State of the Competition: Assessment of Actual score 
2.1 List of Competitors 
Having laid down the rules of our imaginary game, let us now list the com-
petitors: 
2.1.1 The Two-Kinds-of-Semantics-Approach 
The first group of participants, coached by Erik Stenius and, at least in 1967, 
by Lennart Âqvist applies the following training principle : 
The rules which determine meanings at the illocutionary level are wholly 
different in kind from the rules which determine meanings on the locutionary 
level (cf. Stenius 1967: 259). 
I shall call this method the Two-Kinds-of-Semantics-Approach. Stenius 
presents, among others, two competitors subsequently formalized by Âqvist: 
the first form, and the second form of the 'combined game', both of them 
dealing with the communication of two people who report and command 
certain situations in a garden. Stenius' notion logico-semantic mood corre-
sponds to what I call illocution-type. 
The first form of the 'combined game' has no modal element: mood is 
determined entirely by context; the second form of the 'combined game' does 
have modal elements (the modal signs T and 'O'), but these determine logico-
semantic mood, and not grammatical mood. I do not think it trivial to point 
out that natural languages do not correspond to either of these forms but 
seem to be located somewhere between them, since natural modal elements 
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determine not logico-semantic mood, but grammatical mood. Logico-se-
mantic mood (i.e. illocution-type) in turn seems to be determined partly by 
grammatical mood, partly by other features of the sentence, and partly by 
context. 
2.1.2 The Method of Syntactic Imperialism 
The second group of competitors is coached by Ross, Lakoff, Sadock and 
others 2 in conformity with the principles of the so-called Performative 
Analysis which may be summarized as follows: 
A l l sentences occurring in personal contexts derive from deep structures 
containing one and only one superordinate performative clause whose main 
verb is a verb of saying (cf. Ross 1970: 252). 
Since this approach attempts to pass on to syntax the whole bunch of 
problems connected with illocutionary meanings, I call it the method of 
Syntactic Imperialism. There are however, as Gazdar has recently summarized 
(Gazdar 1979: 15-35), only very few, if any, syntactic arguments in favor of 
this approach which bear closer examination. Moreover, the above-mentioned 
principle hinges on the notion of deep structure which is far from being un-
problematic, as we all know. 
The next four methods start from the observation that the truth-conditional 
approach has proved very fruitful for the semantics of declarative sentences. 
They ask: How can this approach be modified in order to encompass non-
declarative sentences as well? 
2.1.3 The Procrustean Method 
There is a very simple, but rather violent answer to this question, which I shall 
call the Procrustean Method and which has been advocated by David Lewis 
among others: 3 We extend the truth-conditional semantics simply by extend-
ing the notion of truth, laying it on a Procrustean bed, so to speak, and cover-
ing both declarative and non-declarative sentences with the extended notion 
of truth. How can we do that? Lewis' answer is as ingenious as it is simple: 
In dealing with a non-declarative sentence we first look for a paraphrase which 
syntactically is a declarative sentence, and then we simply stipulate that the 
meaning of the former equals the meaning of the latter. In fact, the existence 
of Austin's well-known explicit performative sentences4 seems to make this 
search successful, so that Lewis himself calls his method the method of para-
phrased performatives. Unfortunately, this seems to be a rather crude kind of 
reductionism. 
2 Cf. Ross 1970. Lakoff 1975, Sadock 1974, and the literature indicated there. 
3 Lewis 1972. 
4 Austin 1962. 
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2.1.4 The Double Evaluation Method 
A more sophisticated way of reducing the semantics of non-declaratives to 
truth-conditions has been proposed by Donald Davidson. 5 I shall dub it the 
Double Evaluation method, because it assings to non-declarative sentences 
not just one, but two truth conditions: firstly, the truth condition of some kind 
of performative paraphrase - in this respect the method resembles that of 
Lewis - , and secondly, that of its declarative counterpart. Thus the meaning 
of Get off! would be represented by a) the truth-condition of I order you to get 
off. and b) the truth-condition of You get off. 
So if people feel that it's nonsense to speak of the truth-condition of an im-
perative sentence, Lewis just says "I don't care", while Davidson replies in a 
rather tricky way. He says: "Yes, you are right, it's nonsense indeed to speak 
of the truth-condition of a N D S , but not, as you might suppose, because the 
existence condition is not fulfilled, but because the singularity condition is 
not fulfilled : We cannot speak of the truth-condition of a N D S , because there 
are two of them." But I doubt that this proposal comes much closer to intui-
tion than that of Lewis: Whoever thinks that it is counterintuitive to assign 
to a N D S its truth-condition, will not be very happy with a theory which 
assigns to it two of them. 
2.1.5 The Method of Sentence-Mood-Specific-Evaluation 
People who think in the above-mentioned way will be much more content 
with a theory which assigns for instance to an imperative sentence its fulfil-
ment condition, because it is very natural to ask, with respect to an order, 
whether it has been fulfilled or not. This is entirely in line with the following 
remark of Richard Montague: "In connection with imperatives and inter-
rogatives truth and entailment conditions are of course inappropriate, and 
would be replaced by fulfilment conditions and a characterisation of the 
semantic content of a correct answer." (Montague 1974: 248, n. 3) He didn't 
have the time do demonstrate how this could be done, but the answer seems 
to be quite obvious: In the imperative sentence case we can simply equate 
the fulfilment condition of such a sentence with the truth condition of its 
declarative counterpart: e.g. Be late! is fulfilled if and only if the addressee is 
late; in the interrogative sentence case we can characterise a declarative 
sentence as a correct answer if it conjoins the assertion of some subset of T 
with a denial of its complement, where T is the set of propositions determined 
by the interrogative sentence. Since it is sentence mood, which determines in 
this approach the choice of an appropriate value assignment, I shall call it 
the method of Sentence-Mood-Specific-Evaluation. 
5 Davidson 1979. 
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2.1.6 The Method of Illocution-Type-Specific-Evaluation 
The method outlined in the preceding section was the one I had in mind 
when I started out to write my thesis on Interrogatives and Questions in 
German (Zaefferer 1982). But I soon found reasons for abandoning it as still 
too crude a method in order to replace it byv what I shall call the method of 
Illocution-Type-Specific-Evaluation : After all it is not so much sentence mood 
which determines the choice of an appropriate evaluation, but the type of 
illocution realized by an utterance of the sentence under consideration, and 
illocution-type is only partly determined by sentence mood, other factors 
being particles, propositional content and context. This view leads to the 
conclusion that sentences can be ambiguous on the illocutionary level. For 
my fragment of German I proposed that in principle declarative and inter-
rogative sentences can have two il-readings each: The former an assertive and 
a declarational reading, and the latter an erotetic and a rhetorical reading. 
Disambiguating elements could be hiermit 'hereby' in the first and the modal 
particle schon in the second case (more precisely in the case of WH-interro-
gatives). 
2.1.7 The Sentence-Type Approach 
This approach has been challenged in a way by a syntactician, Hans Altmann, 
who is coaching his competitor according to the following, at first glance 
somewhat surprising, hypothesis: 
There is, in principle, a one-to-one correspondence between sentence-type 
and illocution-type.6 
To make this claim plausible, however, three specifications are in order: 
a) Illocution-type should not be regarded as being determined by some pre-
conceived taxonomy like the one proposed by Searle; 
b) sentence type is a much less coarse notion than sentence mood; 
c) the qualification 'in principle' is meant to admit of ambiguities, if necessary. 
Thus the challenge turns out to be rather a refinement and a completion, 
given the fact that Altmann distinguishes some 60 sentence types in German. 
2.2 Assessment of Actual Score 
If we try to assess the actual score of each of our competitors according to the 
proposed criteria, we are confronted with the problem which was mentioned 
at the beginning, that most coaches haven't developed their competitors to 
the point where they really do run and that we are forced to guess how they 
would do so. So the reader should take my own guess presented below not 
too seriously: he may prefer to fill in his own assessment. 
6 Altmann 1981:6. 
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Assessment of actual score 
(CA 1.1) (CA 1.2) (CA 1.3) (CA 1.4) (CA 2.1) (CA 2.2) (CA 2.3) (CA 2.4) (CA 2.5) 
1. Two-Kinds-of-
-Semantics-Approach 
• • • * 7 * 9 
2. Method of Syntactic 
Imperialism 
* * * * * * * * * * * • * * 
* * 
3. Procrustean Method * * * ? ? • * * 9 
4 . Double Evaluation 
Method 
• * ? * 7 * * 7 9 
5. Method of Sentence-
-Mood-Specific-
Evaluation 
• * * * • * * * 
* 
• * * 7 
6. Method of Illocution-
Type-Specific-
Evaluation 










Approach * * 
• 
* * * * * + ? * 7 9 9 
3. Outline of a Promising Strategy 
Three principles seem important for a promising strategy: 
( P I ) To keep in mind all the criteria mentioned above. 
(P 2) To advance step by step from the better known to the less known. 
(P 3) To proceed from the form-types to the function-types. 
3.1 Watching the Criteria Simultaneously 
I think there are two good illustrations for the consequences of disregarding 
this principle: The first one is the Double Evaluation method, which for 
instance reduces the sentence Are you late? to something like: The following 
is a question: You are late. Here the coach seems to have lost sight of the 
syntactic criteria, otherwise he would have seen the trouble he runs into with 
respect to the distinction between existential and WH-interrogatives. He 
cannot reduce both Is anybody late? and Who is late? to The following is a 
question : Anybody/Somebody is late. The second illustration is the Sentence-
Type approach which specifies its semantics in such a low degree, that almost 
none of the semantic criteria can be satisfied to a reasonably interesting extent. 
3.2 Advancing Step by Step from the Better Known to the Less Well Known 
Principle (P2) is almost generally heeded, let me just point out a) that it 
confirms our decision to take truth-conditional semantics as a starting point 
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for the semantics of N D S , and b) that it supports the strategy of enlarging 
fragments of grammars for natural languages. 
3.3 Proceeding from Form-Type to Function-Type (Illocution-Type) 
The reason for preferring this direction of research over its reversal lies in the 
history of speech act theory. I have the impression that it has, involuntarily, 
contributed more to the semantics of natural labels for illocutions than to the 
semantics of natural illocutionary indicators. In fact, there is quite an inter-
esting difference between the (mostly syntactical) means natural languages 
provide for indicating illocution-type, and the lexical means they have for 
labeling it. Whoever has tried to define the form-type corresponding to the 
illocution-type of a warning, or worse, of an examination question, wil l 
understand why I believe that it is more profitable first to define a form-type 
and then to look for the type of function or functions it fulfils. 
Let me now illustrate the proposed strategy by outlining a semantics for 
some types of non-declarative sentences in German. 
4. The Strategy Illustrated: Syntax and Semantics for some NDS-Types 
of German 
4.1 Approaching the Syntactic Criteria ((CA 1.1)-(CA 1.4)) 
4.1.1 Types of Sentences ((CA 1.1)) 
I claim that - disregarding mixed types - there are five main types of sentences 
in German, 7 which are exemplified below together with their embedded 
counterparts and for which I will use the following labels: 
DS (declarative sentences) 
Du bist mein Partner. 
IS (interrogative sentences) 
Bist du mein Partner ? 
Wer ist mein Partner ? 
ES (exclamatory sentences) 
Daß du so groß bist ! 
Wie groß du bist! 
OS (optative sentences) 
Wäre ich nur hingefahren ! 
DS1 (declarative sententials) 
... daß du mein Partner bist. 
IS1 (interrogative sententials) 
...ob du mein Partner bist. 
... wer mein Partner ist. 
ESI (exclamatory sententials) 
... daß du so groß bist. 
... wie groß du bist. 
(OSI) (counterfactual conditionals 
(antecedens)) 
Wäre ich hingefahren, (so ...) 
7 They correspond to five of the eight types of sentences listed by Brugmann (1918) for theindo-
european languages. 
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JS (jussive sentences) 
Sei mein Partner ! 
(JS1) (infinitive phrases) 
... mein Partner zu sein. 
Seien Sie mein Partner ! 
Seien wir Partner ! 
4.1.2 Structural Connections Between Different Types of Sentences 
and Sententials ( (CA 1.2), ( C A 1.3)) 
I assume that sentence-type and type of sentential in German can be defined 
by a six-tuple specifying the properties listed below. So the above-mentioned 
connections correspond to systematic variations in the following six co-
ordinates: 
a) Position of the finite part of the verb, 
b) verbal mood, 
c) reference of subject and object in terms of person-deictic-category, 
d) occurrence, quantity, and quality of interrogative words or complemen-
tizers, 
e) set of admissible modal particles, 
f) punctuation/intonation. 
Since the semantics of declaratives and interrogatives has already been quite 
extensively studied,8 let us now follow principle (P2) and let us try to in-
vestigate the semantics of exclamatory sentences, which seem to be syn-
tactically akin to both declarative and interrogative sentences. 
Before we do that, just one remark regarding (CA 1.4). 
4.1.3 The Distribution of Exclamatory Sententials ((CA 1.4)) 
I take it to be a sufficient condition for an embedded +W-sentential 9 to be an 
ESI, if it complements a superordinate structure which doesn't admit IS1-
complements. Compare the following examples: 1 0 
r ob der kommt. 
Ich frage mich, < was der alles gelesen hat. 
v. *daß der schläft. 
8 See the bibliographies by Egli and Schleichen (in Belnap and Steel 1976) and by Ficht (1978). 
For a recent fragment of German including declarative, interrogative and imperative sentences 
cf. Zaefferer 1982. 
9 I call +W and-W-structures clauses with and without, respectively, the occurrence of a W-
word (like wer, wann, was etc.) in the topmost clause (corresponds to the english WH). 
1 0 Note that the grammaticality of the embedding can depend on the exclamatory type of the 
superordinate clause: 
Du glaubst nicht, was der alles gelesen hat! 
^Glaubst Du nicht, was der alles gelesen hat ? 
*Hans glaubt nicht, was der alles gelesen hat. 
The first sentence is also deviant, if it is read as an ordinary declarative and written with a full 
stop. 
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r *oè der kommt ! 
Es ist unglaublich, < was der alles gelesen hat ! 
Idaß der schläft! 
As a sufficient condition for a rfa/î-clause to be a - W-ES1, I take its inter-
changeability with a + W-ES1. Accordingly, daß du schläfst is a — W-ES1 in 
the example above, but not in the following case, where it is a D S 1 : 1 1 
4.2 Approaching the Semantic Criteria ((CA2.1)-(CA2.5)) 
The core of the semantic criteria is (CA 2.3), I think, and therefore I will say 
only a few words concerning (CA 2.1) and (CA 2.2) in the next two sections. 
(CA 2.4) will be met on the way, but we will touch upon (CA 2.5) only margin-
ally. 
4.2.1 Intuitively Adequate Evaluations ( (CA 2.1)) 
What are the intuitively adequate evaluations for declaratives, interrogatives, 
optatives, jussives, and exclamatories, respectively, in their most prominent 
illocutionary reading each? Disregarding the illocutionary level (cf. (TP1)), 
it was presumed at the outset that most declarative sentences are most 
naturally evaluated in the true/not true dimension ((TP 2)). Interrogatives 
and jussives seem to be most naturally evaluated in the dimensions of answer-
hood and fulfilment, respectively, and optatives and exclamatories I would 
like to evaluate according to their sincerity, the latter ones according to their 
justifiedness as well. Three remarks are in order with respect to these pro-
posals. First, the entities to which sentences are related through the notions 
of truth, answerhood etc., are of quite different nature: Whereas answer hood 
is a relation between interrogative and declarative sentences, with respect to 
a class of models, sentences are true, fulfilled, sincere or justified with respect 
to one given model, which has to specify at least speaker and adressée. Second, 
sincerity also plays a role in the intuitive evaluations of assertions, questions 
and commands, and truth also plays a role in the evaluation at least of ex-
clamations: This shows that dimensions of evaluation are not exclusively 
correlated with one single illocution-type but that they rather seem to form 
a bundle from among which one on the other member appears to be more 
prominent, according to the illocution-type chosen. Third, the choice of an 
1 1 The grammaticality of the following example does not lessen the validity of the above charac-
terisation, since the W-clause is in this case a free relative: 
Ich glaube nicht, was der sagt. 
For a systematic treatment of the ISl/free relative ambiguity in German see Zaefferer (forth-
coming). 
476 D. Zaefferer 
adequate dimension of evaluation for a sentence at the locutionary level 
seems to depend on its meaning at the illocutionary level. At this level, the 
adequate dimension of evaluation is the same for all types of sentences: 
namely the dimension of happiness. So we will have to define at least the 
notions of sincerity, justifiedness and happiness for our exclamatory sentences. 
4.2.2 1-and il-Ambiguities ((CA 2.2)) 
The treatment of ambiguities is an interesting touch-stone for every semantic 
theory and if there are illocutionary ambiguities as well, it is an important 
task for the semantics of illocutionary indicators to account for them. As 
mentioned in 2.1.6 above, I claimed in Zaefferer 1982 that there are at least 
two il-ambiguities in German: between an assertive and a declarational read-
ing of certain declarative sentences, and between an erotetic and a rhetorical 
reading of many interrogatives. Let me just add for the present context that 
some German sentences, in their orthographic representation, have a directive 
as well as an exclamatory reading, e.g.: 
Sprechen Sie aber deutlich ! 
This sentence has two phonologically as well as il-semantically clearly 
distinct readings, although both express the same proposition, namely that 
the addressee speaks distinctly. The exclamatory reading has stress on Sie, 
the polite second person pronoun, and expresses amazement about the 
adressee's clear pronounciation, the directive reading has stress on deutlich 
and expresses some kind of admonition to pronounce clearly. 
The example is a case of homography without homophony, and in this 
respect it is like many il-ambiguities, since intonation is often used for i l -
disambiguation. 
4.2.3 Logical Properties and Relations ((CA 2.3), (CA 2.4)) 
Let us now start our investigation of the meaning of German exclamatory 
sentences by trying to find out their logical properties. What are the logical 
properties of sentences like (l)-(5)? 
(1) Kennt Mia die (doch glatt) alle! 
Knows M i a them (really) all 
(2) Mia kennt die (doch glatt) alle ! 
(3) Daß Mia die (doch glatt) alle kennt ! 
(4) Wen Mia alles kennt ! 
Who M i a all knows 
(5) Wen kennt Mia nicht alles ! 
Although there are clear syntactic differences between (l)-(3) ( —W-ES) as 
well as between (4) and (5) (+W-ES), I will ignore the possibility that there 
are semantic differences associated with them and start out from the simplify-
ing assumption that the members of each group are synonymous, so that only 
two meanings have to be investigated. 
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4.2.3.1 The Semantics of - W - E S 1 
First let us have a look at the — W-ES (l)-(3). They have a natural declarative 
counterpart in (6): 
(6) Mia kennt die alle. 
M i a knows them all 
Since die alle is a deictic term, the logical properties of (6) are best illustrated 
by specifying a context for (6). Let us suppose for simplicity a context C 1 ? 
where just K a r l and Noam are the persons to whom die alle refers. Then (6) 
is Cx-equivalent to (7) and it C x-entails (7)-(9): 
(7) Mia kennt Karl und Noam. 
M i a knows K a r l and Noam 
(8) Mia kennt Karl. 
(9) Mia kennt Noam. 
This is due to the fact that kennen, by contrast to e.g. verwechseln (to mix 
up), is a distributive predicate.1 2 The question is now whether analogously 
one of the exclamatory counterparts of (6), e.g. (1), Cx -entails somehow one 
of the exclamatory counterparts of (8), e.g. (10): 
(10) Kennt Mia (doch glatt) Karl! 
In order to answer this question, however, we have to leave the field of 
truth-conditional semantics, and before we do that, it is perhaps useful to 
investigate first the semantics of embedded exclamatories (ESI), which pose 
no problems to truth-conditional analysis, if they are embedded in declara-
tive sentences. We said above (4.1.3) that — W-ES1 are da/?-clauses just like 
ordinary DS1, except that they are interchangeable with -F W-ES1. Let us 
therefore first have a look at the semantics of DS1 and ask for the logical 
properties of a DS which embeds the DSl-counterpart of (6): 
(11) Es trifft zu, daß Mia die alle kennt. 
It is the case, that M i a them all knows 
There is little doubt, I think, that (11) is Q-equivalent to (12), and that it 
C 1-entails(12)-(14): 
(12) Es trifft zu, daß Mia Karl und Noam kennt. 
(13) Es trifft zu, daß Mia Karl kennt. 
(14) Es trifft zu, daß Mia Noam kennt. 
This is due to the fact that in addition to what we know about (6)-(9), 
zutreffen is closed under logical entailment, by contrast to, e.g. glauben 
(believe). Now let us compare the logical properties of another DS which 
embeds the ESl-counterpart to (l)-(3): 
(15) Es ist erstaunlich, daß Mia die alle kennt. 
It is astonishing, that M i a them all knows 
It seems to me that although (15) is Cl-equivalent to (16), it does not es-
entai! either (17) or (18): 
1 2 Not in the technical sense explicated in Link 1982 but in an intuitive one: If a distributive 
predicate is true of a sum of entities, then it is true of all subsums, including the atoms, if any. 
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(16) Es ist erstaunlich, daß Mia Karl und Noam kennt. 
(17) Es ist erstaunlich, daß Mia Karl kennt. 
(18) Es ist erstaunlich, daß Mia Noam kennt. 
Of course, the names are chosen in such a way that probably the truth of the 
complement of (18) is the reason for the truth of (16)- if we understand kennen 
in the sense of being personally acquainted with -, so removing K a r l from the 
sum of persons under consideration wouldn't make the proposition false, but 
in general we can't be sure that truth is preserved if we remove any one of 
these persons. It doesn't matter, whether it is the quantity or the quality of the 
persons referred to by die alle in (15), or some combination of quantity and 
quality which is amazing : taking away one person might change the truth 
value, so no corresponding sentence is entailed by (15). 
In other words, unlike zu treffen, erstaunlich sein is not closed under logical 
entailment, and, generalising, one might hypothesize that no ESl-taking 
predicate has this property, whereas some DSl-taking predicates do. 
Since the semantic differences between these sentences can be reduced to 
meaning differences between the embedding predicates, it seems safe to 
assume that the embedded structures, namely DS1 and — W-ES1 are not only 
syntactically, but also semantically identical. 
4.2.3.2 The Semantics of + W-ES1 
Now we will investigate the semantics of +W-ES1, contrasting them first 
with their homonymous counterparts, which this time are interrogative 
sententials. Consider (19)—(22): 
(19) Es fragt sich, wen Mia alles kennt. 
It asks itself whom M i a all knows 
(20) Es fragt sich, ob Mia Karl und Noam kennt. 
It asks itself whether M i a Kar l and Noam knows 
(21) Es fragt sich, ob Mia Karl kennt. 
(22) Es fragt sich, ob Mia Noam kennt. 
In all contexts C 2 , where Kar l and Noam are persons, (20)-(22) are C 2 -
entailed by (19). But now compare a DS with a homonymous exclamatory 
sentential: 
(23) Es ist erstaunlich, wen Mia alles kennt. 
Even if C 3 is such that M i a knows K a r l and Noam, (23) doesn't C 3 -entail 
any one of (16)—(18), since M i a might know 400 other persons, and it might 
be the quantity and quality of this sum which makes Mia's knowing all of 
them astonishing. If we consider, however, a C 4 where Kar l and Noam are 
the only persons known by M i a , we can say that (23) is C 4-equivalent to (16). 
Analogously, if in C 5 die alle are the only persons known by M i a , (23) is C 5 -
equivalent to (15). 
These data point at the possibility of approaching the semantics of (23) by 
trying a paraphrase like (23 a): 
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(23 a) Es ist erstaunlich, daß Mia alle die kennt, die sie kennt. 
But ist (23a) really a paraphrase? Doesn't (23a) express a rather silly pro-
position, whereas (23) does not, namely that a triviality is astonishing? In one 
reading yes, but in another reading not. I will try to make the second reading 
clear by giving a somewhat less natural paraphrase: 
(23 b) Die Summe der Personen, die Mia kennt, ist derart, daß es erstaunlich 
ist, daß Mia sie alle kennt. 
The sum of persons known by M i a is such that it is astonishing that 
she knows them all. 
How can we formally represent this? Let us first look for translations of 
(6) and (15). There we have the deictic plural term phrase die alle. I will take 
Link's plural extension of Montague semantics as a starting point. (Cf. 
G . Link's contribution to this volume.) Link translates for instance the plural 
term phrase (24) into (24'): 
(24) die Kinder 
(24') P V y [y = a*x[Kim/'(x)] A P{y}] 
The set of properties of some individual concept which is the plural sum 
of those individual concepts which are children. 
The plural sum operator a*u, where u is a variable, takes open formulas 
and builds a term denoting the at least two-membered sum of all those 
entities which satisfy the formula. Correspondingly, we translate die aile as 
follows, treating the free variable as deictic element: 
(25) die, alle 
(25') P V y [y = a*x[*Pers(x) A ^ x u v j A P{y}] 
The set of properties of some individual concept which is the p-sum 
(plural sum) of those individual concepts which are persons and part 
Of V j . 
V i is meant to denote the sum of individuals pointed at, capital Greek n 
denotes the individual-part-of relation. 
The left side upstar operator takes any predicate F and converts it into a 
predicate of arbitrary sums of elements of the extension of F . 
Now we are in a position to translate (6) and (15). (I give first order-reduced 
versions as far as this is possible): 
(6') /cenrc'*(m,a*u[*Pers*(u) A u l l v ^ ) 
(15') erstaunlich' Çkenri*(m,o*u [*Pers*(u) A u n vj)) 
Starting from (15') it's easy to translate (23 b): We lambda-abstract from 
(15') the set of sums of persons for which it is astonishing that M i a knows all 
of them, and assert that the sum of persons actually known by M i a belongs 
to it. This is what (23') says: 
(23') [Xverstaunlich'(~kenri*(m,o*u[*Pers*(u) A u n v]))] 
(a*u[*Pers*(u) A /cerni*(m,u)]) 
(23') is not equivalent with the 'silly reading' which would assert a triviality 
to be astonishing, since lambda-conversion is here blocked by the fact that 
the denotation of the argument is index-dependent and the lambda-bound 
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variable v is in the scope of an intensional operator. So I propose (23') as a 
(maximally first order reduced) translation of (23). 
Let us stop here for a while and let's try a first test of intuitive adequacy. I 
indicated above that in contexts of type C 5 , where the set of persons denoted 
by die alle equals the set of persons known by M i a , (15) is intuitively C 5 -
equivalent with (23). Let's see whether our translations give a formal recon-
struction of this datum. 
I take a model to be an ordered tripel (si, i , g>, where si is an interpretation, 
i is an si -index including a speaker coordinate and g is an si -assignment of 
values to variables, and I take a context-type to be any subset of M D G , the 
set of models for Disambiguated German. I call m-Ex(x) the extension of x 
in a model m. Let us define context-type C 5 as follows: 
( D l ) C 5 : = {m I m s M D G & m-Ex(v l = a*u[*Pers*(u) A kenn* 
(m,u)]) = l} 
The formula in the definition of C 5 works as a, as I like to call it, local 
meaning postulate, which if we conjoin it with any formula yields a C 5 -
equivalent one. Therefore, (15') is C 5-equivalent with (15 a'), and the (In-
equivalence of (15a') with (23a') and then with (23') is easy to see: 
(15a') Vj = a*u[*Pers*(u) A kenn'*(m,u)] A erstaunlich' 
( /<ettfl'*(m,a*u[*Pers*(u) A u l l v ^ ) 
(23 a') Vv[v = a*u[*Pers*(u) A kenn'* (m, u)] A erstaunlich' { kenn'* 
(m,a*u[*Pers(u) A U F I V ] ) ) ] 
This seems to be a quite satisfactory result, but thus far we didn't yet leave 
the solid ground of truth conditional semantics for declarative sentences. Let 
us now venture on more shaky soil and come back to the question pondered 
at the outset of the last paragraph, whether (1) intuitively entails (10). 
4.2.3.3 The Semantics of - W-ES 
Since entailment cannot be defined here in terms of truth conditions, unless 
we subscribe to the Procrustean method, let us take the following sketch of a 
definition as a guideline for our intuitions: 
(D2) Sentence Sj il-entails sentence S 2 iff whoever does what normally is 
done by an utterance of S t also does what normally is done by an 
utterance of S 2 . 
Let Cl be again the context-type where die alle refers to just K a r l and Noam. 
Let us assume furthermore that by uttering (1) one normally expresses his 
amazement (or something like that) at the fact that M i a knows all of them, 
and that by uttering (10) one normally expresses his amazement at the fact 
that M i a knows Kar l . Then our question whether (1) Cj-il-entails (10) 
amounts to the question, whether whoever expresses his amazement at Mia's 
knowing both K a r l and Noam also expresses his amazement at Mia's know-
ing K a r l . A n d this, it seems, is not the case, for thé very same reason which led 
us to reject the inference from (16) to (17) or (18). Note that the precise nature 
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of the attitude expressed, be it amazement, astonishment, surprise or some-
thing like that, need not concern us here, provided it has this feature of - as 
I'd like to call it - non-distributivity, and I'd like to venture the thesis that all 
attitudes expressible by the use of exclamatory sentences share this feature. 
One might suppose furthermore that all predicates embedding exclamatory 
sententials share this feature as well. But the observation that their negative 
counterparts seem to lack it shows that this is too strong an assumption: 
(26a) £ 5 ist nicht erstaunlich, daß Mia die alle kennt. 
(26b) Es ist nicht erstaunlich, daß Mia Karl kennt. 
Apparently, (26a) does C r e n t a i l (26b). A n d the difference cannot be made 
dependent on overt negation since predicates like es ist ganz normal (it is 
quite normal) behave in the same way. Further research would be needed in 
order to satisfy (CA 2.5), but I don't want to go here into that matter further. 
Let us now try to reconstruct formally our intuitions about the logical 
properties of exclamatory sentences. The logical representations of our sample 
sentences (1) and (10) will probably be similar to those or their declarative 
counterparts (6) and (8), which are as follows (6' is repeated for convenience): 
(6') &ew7*(m,a*u[*Pers*(u) A U Ü V J ] ) 
(8') kenn^(m,k) 
But whereas (8) is Ci-entailed by (6), some device will have to block the 
analogous inference from (1) to (10). In the corresponding embedded cases 
((11) to (13): C t-entailment; (15) to (17): no C{-entailment) it was the nature 
of the embedding predicate which effected the difference. It seems natural to 
proceed in an analogous way by introducing an abstract predicate E X C , 
intended to represent the grammatical meaning of the combinations of 
syntactic features that characterize the exclamatory sentence type, about 
which nothing has to be known except that ist has the above-mentioned 
feature of non-distributivity. 
The introduction of abstract predicates need not worry us too much since 
we need them anyway: In order to capture the semantic correlate of the 
morphosyntactic forms die alle and wen (as opposed to das alles und was, 
respectively) we used without discussion the abstract predicate '*Pers'. Why 
shouldn't we capture the semantic correlate of the syntactic difference be-
tween e.g. (1) and (6) in an analogous way? So we get the following transla-
tions: 
(1) Kennt Mia die (doch glatt) alle! 
(V) EXCf /c^ '* (m,a*u[*Pers*(u) A U O V J ) 
(10) Kennt Mia (doch glatt) Karl! 
(10') E X C f f c ^ ; ( m , k ) ) 
(27) Kennt Mia (doch glatt) Karl und Noam! 
(270 E X C ( > ^ « ; ( m , a * u [ u = k v u = n])) 
It is easy to see that (1') doesn't C t -entail (10'), but that it does C{ -entail 
(27'),if we define C x as follows: 
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(D3) Cx: = {m|m s M D G & m - E x ( v , = a*u[u = k v u = n]) = l} 
According to (D3), Cx is that type of context, where die alle refers to K a r l 
and Noam. 
The introduction of our abstract predicate seems to pay, but not yet 
enough to dissipate the qualms some may have about it. We need more 
evidence for ist usefulness or perhaps necessity. And we'd like to know more 
about its properties, if it is indeed necessary. 
4.2.3.4 The Semantics of + W-ES 
The next step we can take is to see how our abstract predicate works in con-
nection with + W-exclamatory sentences. We have shown above the (In-
equivalence of (15) and (23) for contexts of type C 5 where die alle refers to the 
sum of persons known by M i a . The question is now, whether intuitively (1) 
C 5-il-entails (4) and vice versa. I think, this is the case, and if we translate (1) 
and (4) in a way analogous to (15) and (23), we can indeed reconstruct this 
finding formally ((1') is given above, (4) is repeated for convenience): 
(4) Wen Mia alles kennt ! 
(4') [X\ EXCÇkenri*(m, a*u [*Pers*(u) A U II v]))] 
(a* u [*Pers* (u) A kenn'* (m, u)]) 
The fact that without the intension operator we would get a 'silly reading', 
namely that the attitude is expressed with respect to a triviality, motivates a 
further property of E X C , namely that it is of type (st)t, and not just a truth 
function. But this is still very little. 
4.2.3.5 Characterizing E X C : Some Hypotheses 
A n additional hypothesis concerning the properties of E X C might be derived 
from the fact that ESl-taking predicates tend to be factive, i.e. to entail the 
truth of their complement, whether they are negated or not. Since there will 
be no opportunity to test the properties of a negated E X C , we can content 
ourselves with hypothezising that E X C is implicative, i.e. that it entails the 
truth of its complement. This hypothesis can be formulated as the following 
meaning postulate: 
Implicativity 
( M P I ) • [ E X C ( 0 ) -> ~0] (0 8 M E s t ) 
Then, given the indicated translations, (28) entails formally (7): 
(28) Kennt Mia (doch glatt) Karl und Noam! 
(7) Mia kennt Karl und Noam. 
(T) kenn*(m,o*u[u = k v u = n]) 
Let us see whether this is quite in line with intuition, if we let ( D l ) be the 
guideline for intuition. Does whoever expresses his amazement at Mias know-
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ing Ka r l and Noam also assert (or something like that) that she knows them? 
(For asserting this seems to be what speakers normally do, when they utter (7).) 
I am inclined to say yes, but I am also quite sure that not everybody will agree. 
The issue cannot be settled, of course, unless we explicate what it is what 
speakers normally do when they utter sentences like (7). Probably I have a 
weaker notion in mind than my opponents. But we can leave the question 
open if we are willing to name this notion with the abstract predicate ASS 
(which is not meant to coincide with the natural predicate 'assert', but to be 
related to it) and to represent the meaning of (7) by (7"): 
(7") ASSÇkenri*(m,o*u[u = k v u = n])) 
Then there are two meaning representations, for (7) : (7') for the locutionary 
or 1-meaning and (7") for the il-meaning, and since we have two levels of 
meaning, we get four kinds of entailment: 1-entailment, il-entailment, i l , 
1-entailment, and il,l-entailment. The above-mentioned hypothesis now 
amounts to the assumption that (27) il,l-entails (7), that is, that what is done 
by a normal utterance of (27) entails what is asserted by a normal utterance 
of (7), in other words, that (27) cannot be given successfully its normal use 
without (7) being true (truth of course being defined on the locutionary level). 
And this is of course much too strong an assumption, since it would make 
it impossible e.g. to exclaim at a state of affairs which only seems to exist. 
So implicativity does not make sense as a partial characterization of E X C . 
It does make sense, however, to see whether (27) il-entails (7), in other words, 
whether (MP2) is intuitively correct or not: 
Assertiueness 
(MP2) • [ E X C ( 0 ) - > ASS(0)] ( 0 e M E s l ) 
If not, the intuitive relationship is better accounted for by ( M P 3), which 
represents the common denominator hypothesis: 
Common denominator 
(MP3) • [ E X C ( 0 ) v ASS(0) -+ B E L ( 0 ) ] ( 0 8 M E J 
( M P 3) seems to be less attractive, since it introduces a third abstract predi-
cate, B E L , which may be read intuitively as 'speaker commits himself to the 
belief that', but which of course has to be characterized formally. It might 
turn out that it is needed anyway, e.g. in order to explain Moore's paradox. 
In any case, we are free now to drop ( M P I ) , which makes it possible to 
separate the notions of happiness and of truth of exclamatory sentences, 
which will be done in (D 6) below. 
4.2.3.6 Content, Topic and Focus of + W-Exclamatories 
Before we can come back to the characterisation of E X C , the following prob-
lem has to be solved: If we adopt the indicated way of implementing the 
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Austinian idea of two levels of meaning generally, how can we represent the 
1-meaning of sentences like (4)? Remember that (7') is just (7") minus the 
abstract predicate, parentheses and intensionaliser. If we subtract analogously 
from (4'), we get (4"): 
(4") [kv/centt'*(m,a*u[*Pers*(u) A unv])](a*u[*Pers*(u)/c^M*(m,u)]) 
But this is equivalent with (4"'), the trivial formula which was the core of 
what we called the 'silly reading* of (23 a), and which is false only if M i a knows 
less than two persons: 
(4"') /cenrc*(m,a*u[*Pers*(u) A kenri*(m,u)~\) 
So the m-intension of (4"') cannot be the object of the propositional atti-
tudes expressed by the m-speaker of (4). But how else can we construct this 
object? Let us first see what these attitudes are related to. First, they are 
related to the p-sum of persons actually known by M i a ; let us call this the 
topic of this object. Second, they are related to the open proposition that M i a 
knows all persons from v; let us call this the focussed entity and the cor-
responding function from individuals in propositions the focus of the object 
we are looking for. Then this topic and this focus can be represented as 
follows: 
(4 top) G * U [*Pers*(u) A /<ew?'*(m,u)] 
(4 foe) Xv~kenri*(m,a*u[*Pers*(u) A u II v]) 
Now the object in question is nothing else than the proposition obtained 
by applying its focus to its topic; let us call this the content of (4). It can be 
represented as follows: 
(4 con) [X,v"ten*(m,a*u[*Pers*(u) A u l l v])](a*u [*Pers*(u) 
A /cewi*(m,u)]) 
So what matters with respect to propositional attitudes is not the m-inten-
sion of the 1-meaning representation of a sentence but its content in m, and 
these may be different propositions, although their truth values at the index 
of m coincide. This explains why + W-exclamatories are so little informative : 
They tell us a triviality, e.g. what (4' ' ') says, but nevertheless they express 
attitudes towards non-trivial propositions, e.g. the one represented in (4 con). 
Accordingly, the question whether a 4- W-exclamatory is true in m is not 
very interesting, since they are almost always true ((4"') represents the truth-
condition of (4)). Of greater interest are the questions whether it is justified 
in m, i.e. whether its content is really amazing, and whether its speaker is 
sincere in m, i.e. whether he believes that its content is true in m (t-sincerity) 
and that it is justified in m (j-sincerity). Before I proceed to a definition of 
these notions, some remarks are in order with respect to the concepts of 
topic and focus we used in constructing the content of + W-exclamatories. 
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Can we forget about them once they have done their job? I think not, since 
we need them anyway in order to answer questions of contextual appro-
priateness, and since they are already well-established in the literature in 
connection with the other prominent category of + W-sentences, namely 
+ W-interrogatives. It will be illuminating to contrast the semantic properties 
of exclamatory sentences with those of their interrogative counterparts. 
+ W-interrogatives are generally regarded as topic-setters for answering 
declaratives.1 3 Concerning their own topic-focus-structure, however, differ-
ent opinions can be found in the literature (cf. e.g. von Stechow 1980 and 
Wunderlich 1981). M y own view agrees with von Stechow in identifying the 
topic of an interrogative like Who comes ? with the property (of persons) of 
coming, it disagrees, however, with von Stechow in as far as it regards the 
content of this interrogative as the open proposition that x is the maximum 
entity which has this property. So the notions of an answer and a complete 
direct answer are definable in terms of the topic and the content, respectively, 
of the interrogative in question: 
(D4) A declarative sentence S 2 is an answer to an interrogative sentence S x 
iff their topics coincide; S 2 is a complete direct answer to S x iff their contents 
coincide for some variable assignment g; and S 2 is a complete indirect answer 
to S x iff it entails a complete direct answer to S x without being equivalent to 
it. 
(D 5) A possible denotation d is the topic of a declarative sentence S 2 with 
respect to an interrogative sentence Sj iff a) d is a possible topic of S 2 and b) 
d is the topic of Sj. 
A possible denotation d is a possible topic of a declarative sentence S if there 
is a possible denotation f such that f(d) is the content of S. 
Now the promised definitions for exclamatories : 
(D 6) A n exclamatory sentence is 
(a) happy in m iff the m-extension of its il-meaning representation is 1 ; 
(b) true in m iff the m-extension of its 1-meaning representation is 1 ; 
(c) justified in m iff the m-extension of erstaunlich' (0) is 1, where © is its 
content representation; 
(d) t-sincere in m iff the m-speaker believes the m-extension of 0 (0 as 
above); 
(e) j-sincere in m iff the m-speaker believes the m-intension of erstaunlich' (0) 
(0 as above); 
(0 perfect in m iff it is happy, justified, and j-sincere in m. 
If we assume factivity of erstaunlich' and a rational notion of belief, i.e. one 
that is closed under K-entailment (K being the class of interpretations for 
which the meaning postulates hold), then justified entails true, and j-sincere 
entails t-sincere. 
1 3 This tradition can be traced back at least to Hatcher 1956. 
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Furthermore: 
(D 7) Let S 2 be an exclamatory sentence and S x a declarative one. Then 
(a) S 2 is contextually appropriate with respect to S j iff the 1-meaning repre-
sentation of S 2 is entailed by the 1-meaning representation of Sj ; 
(b) S 2 is topic-preserving with respect to S x only if either (S 2 top) and (S1 top) 
are equivalent or (S 2 top) denotes the sum of possible denotations having 
the property denoted by (Sl top); otherwise S 2 is topic-shifting with 
respect to 
4.2.3.7 The Upward Closure Property 
U p to now, our attempts to characterize E X C have not yet been very success-
ful. We have stated that unlike zutreffen and like erstaunlich it is not closed 
under logical entailment, that unlike erstaunlich it is not factive (or impli-
cative), and that like ASS it entails that the speaker is committed to believing 
the propositions denoted by its argument expression. Now the findings of 
the preceeding paragraph point at an additional property of erstaunlich, 
which seems to be shared by E X C . 
Remember the reason which blocked the inference from (16) to (17) or (18): 
The fact that M i a knows K a r l and Noam entails the fact that M i a knows 
Kar l , but the fact that the first thing is amazing does not entail that the 
second one is so too: The reason for the amazingness might be the identity of 
Noam, and not that of Ka r l or some property of the sum of the two. If, how-
ever, we widen our scope on persons known by M i a , amazingness is preserved : 
If she knows K a r l and Noam, and if it is amazing that she knows Noam, then 
it is amazing that she knows them both, and so on up to the sum of all persons 
known by her. I will call this the upward closure property. M P 4 formulates 
my hypothesis that erstaunlich and E X C have this property: 
Upward closure property 
( M P 4 ) [ y f Ç(T!)) - y([AjfÇ(x)](ay R(y)])] 
where y e {erstaunlich', E X C } , 
r| e ME, . , X, y 8 Var Y , and 
Ç 8 M E e . c t , Q and T being types. 
4.3 Interrogatives, Declaratives, and Exclamatories in German: 
an Illustrative Example 
I will summarize my proposal for a semantics of German exclamatory sentences 
not by giving the syntactical and the translation rules, 1 4 but by an illustration 
which shows the similarities as well as the differences between such sentences 
and related declaratives and interrogatives. The notation is as follows: If (n) 
1 4 How this could be done in principle should be obvious from the examples. I plan to do it 
explicity in a revised and enlargened version of my 1982 fragment of German. 
The Semantics of Non-Declaratives: Investigating German Exlamatories 487 
is the (orthographic representation of) the sentence under consideration, 
(n il) is an il-meaning representation of (n), (n top) ((n/m top)) is a topic re-
presentation of (n) (in the context of (m)), (n foe) ((n/m foe)) is a focus represen-
tation of (n) (in the context of (m)), (n con) is a content representation of (n). 
A separate representation of the 1-meaning of (n), (n 1) is not needed since it is 
always ~0, if 0 is a (n con). 
(28) Wen kennt Mia alles? 
(28 il) A u [®Pers*(u) - E R O ( W * ( m , u | ] 
For all p-sums of persons u: Speaker asks whether M i a knows u. 
(29 top) û [®Pers*(u) A /cewz'*(m,u)] 
The property of being a p-sum of persons known by M i a . 
(28 foc) ) i M f v = a * u [ M {u}]] 
The function which maps properties on the open proposition that v 
is the p-sum of individuals having this property. 
(28 con) "v = a*u [®Pers*(u) A /cewz*(m,u)] 
The open proposition that v is the p-sum of persons known by Mia . 
(29) Kennt Mia die, alle? 
(29 il) EROffcenn*(m,a*u[*Pers*(u)unv 1])) 
Speaker asks whether M i a knows the p-sum of persons which are 
part of the deictically identified object denoted by Vj (for short: 
the Vj-persons). 
(29 top) ~/cewi*(m,a*u[*Pers*(u) A u n v j ) 
The proposition that M i a knows the v t-persons. 
(29 foc) Xq~[[p = q v p = ~ - i ~q] A v p ] 
The function which maps propositions q on the open proposition 
that p is the case, where p is either q or its negative counterpart. 
(29 con) ~[[p = ~fcewH*(m,CT*u[*Pers*(u) A U F I V J ) V 
p = ~-i/ce/?tt'*(m,a*u[*Pers*(u) A ur iv j ] ) ] A ~p] 
The open proposition that p is the case, where p is either the pro-
position that M i a knows the Vj-persons or the proposition that 
she doesn't know them. 
(6) Mia kennt diex alle. 
(6 il) ASS(^/ iw*(m,a*u[*Pers*(u) A U U V J ] ) ) 
Speaker asserts that M i a knows the Vj-persons. 
(6/28 top) û [®Pers*(u) A kenn* (m, u)] 
(6/29 top) ~/ctW*(m ,G*u [*Pers*(u) A u l l v j ) 
(6/28 foc) XM~M{a*u[*Pers*(u) A u ü v j } 
The function which maps each property on the proposition that 
the \ l -persons have this property. 
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(6/29 foc) Xpp 
The identity function on propositions. 
(6 con) ~/cercn*(m,a*u[*Pers*(u) A u u v j ) 
The proposition that M i a knows the Vj-persons. 
(30) Mia kennt diex alle und sonst niemand x. 
(30 il) ASS(Äfcenn*(m,a*u[*Pers*(u) A u l l ^ ] ) A -I V v [ n vYlvl A 
/cewi*(m,a*u[*Pers*(u) A ul lv])]) 
Speaker asserts the content (see below). 
(30/28 top) û [®Pers* (u) A kenn* (m, u)] 
(30/29 top) ~kenn'*{mtG*u[*Pers*(u) A U Ü ^ ] ) 
(30/28 foc) XM[^M{a*u[*Pers*(u) A u E l v J } A 
A - i V v [ - i v n v j A M{a*u[*Pers*(u) A U U V ] } ] ] 
The function which maps each property on the proposition that 
the v r persons have this property and nobody else. 
(30/29 foc) À p [ " p A I V v f I wYlv1 
A /cew2'*(m,a*u[*Pers*(u) A u l l v ] ) ] ] 
The function which maps each proposition p on the proposition 
that p is the case and that there is no object except the one denoted 
by v x such that M i a knows the p-sum of persons which are part 
of it. 
(30con) "/cetttt,*(m,a*u[*Pers*(u) A u n v j ) 
A -1 V v [—I V U \
l
 A 
/centt'*(m,a*u[*Pers*(u) A U I T V ] ) ] 
The proposition that M i a knows the v t-persons and nobody 
else. 
(3) Daß Mia diex alle kennt ! 
(3 il) EXC(^/ccW*(m,a*u[*Pers*(u) A u n v j ) 
Speaker exclaims at the content (see below). 
(3 top) ~/ceflrt'*(m,a*u[*Pers*(u) A u n v j ) 
(3 foe) Xpp 
The identity function on propositions 
(3 con) = (3 top) 
(4) Wen Mia alles kennt ! 
(4 il) E X C i ï A . v ^ n n * ( m , a * u [ * P e r s * ( u ) A u l l v ] ) 
(a*u[*Pers*(u) A /cerni*(m,U)])) 
Speaker exclaims at the content (see below). 
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(4 top) a*u[*Pers*(u) A /cercn'*(m,u)] 
The p-sum of persons known by M i a 
(4 foe) >iv[~/cetttt*(m,a*u[*Pers*(u) A u l lv ] ) ] 
The function which maps each individual on the proposition that 
M i a knows the p-sum of persons which are part of it. 
(4con) piv~/cewi*(m,au[*Pers*(u) A u l l v ] ) ] 
(a*u[*Pers*(u) A kenn'* (m, u)]) 
The proposition that M i a knows the p-sum of persons which are 
part of v, where v is the p-sum of persons known by her. 
The examples show that I regard declarative sentences as having a con-
text-dependent topic-focus structure, whereas interrogatives and exclama-
tories (without special intonation) are supposed to have a fixed one. Topic 
and focus of (6) and (30) with respect to (28) and (29) are constructed in 
accordance with (D 5). 
According to (D 4), (6) and (30) are an answer and a complete direct answer 
to (28), respectively ; with respect to (29), (6) is a complete direct answer and (30) 
is a complete indirect answer. According to (D 7), both (3) and (4) are con-
textually appropriate with respect to both (6) and (30). (3) is topic-preserving 
with respect to (6/29) and (30/29), it is topic-shifting with respect to (6/28) and 
(30/28). (4), on the other hand, is topic-preserving with respect to (6/28) and 
(30/28), and topic-shifting with respect to (6/29) and (30/29). 
Finally, according to ( M P 4) and (D 6), (3) il-entails (4) but not vice versa, 
and (3) is perfect only if (4) is, but not vice versa. And this ist, I think, as it 
should be, since to utter (4) seems to be a much weaker and safer thing than 
to utter (3), and I cannot think of anything which is done by a normal utterance 
of (4), which would not also be done by a normal utterance of (3). 
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